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NOTES

TAKING IT ON THE CHENERY:
SHOULD THE PRINCIPLES OF CHENERY I
APPLY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CASES?

Bryan C. Bond*
INTRODUCTION

Facing an increasing caseload,' federal courts must review
thousands of Social Security disability cases each year, with most ending in reversal of the agency's decision. 2 Judges have grown frustrated
with the process, believing that the Social Security Administration
often wrongfully denies claims. 3 Indeed, a few courts have even
threatened sanctions against the agency for ignoring precedent and
thereby "forcing claimant after claimant to file lawsuits in order to
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.S.B.A.,
Information Systems Auditing and Controls, Bowling Green State University, 1999.
This Note is dedicated to my late father, David, who always hoped I would become an
attorney. I am grateful to Amy C. Barrett, Brian H. Boyle, William K. Kelley, Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, and Jay H. Tidmarsh for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also
would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review-especially Alexander
P. Gallucci, Patrick J. Hines, Thomas W. Keenan, Benjamin M. Ostrander, Ryan R.
Raybould, G. Ryan Snyder, and Amelia G. Yowell-for their editing, advice, and
encouragement.
1 See CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY § 1:1, at 2-3 (2009
ed.) (noting that more than 335,000 cases were filed in federal district courts in 2007,
marking a twenty-five percent increase over a fifteen-year period); JOHN ROBERTS,
2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10-12 (2010), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf (showing that
more than 360,000 cases were filed in federal district courts in 2010).
2 See KUBITSCHEK, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 4.
3 See id.§ 1:1, at 6.
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obtain deserved benefits."'4 As Congress put it, there is an "increasing
number and intensity of confrontations between the agency and the
5
courts as [the agency] refuses to apply circuit court opinions."
The principles of SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1),6 as applied,
exacerbate these issues by preventing courts from directly enforcing
their precedents. In Chenery, the Supreme Court established the "simple but fundamental rule of administrative law ....

that a reviewing

court, in dealing with a determination orjudgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency."' 7 One
important corollary of this rule is that a court generally must remand
to an agency if it finds the agency has committed legal error or has
failed to address a material issue. 8

4 Id. § 1:1, at 7 (citing Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (D. Colo.
1983); see Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J., concurring specially)).
5 H.R. REP. No. 98-618, at 25 (1984); see KUBITSCHEK, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 7
n.29.
6 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
7 SEC v. Chenery Corp. ( Cheneiy I1), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (summarizing the
holding of Chenery 1).
8 See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 291 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("If the court of appeals finds legal error, it must
remand the case to the agency, which may then consider whether to exercise its discretion . . . . This is the lesson of Chenery and its progeny. . . ."); KUBITSCHEK, supra
note 1, § 9:49, at 899 ("The United States Supreme Court has held that if an administrative agency has committed an error of law and has decided a case using an
improper legal standard, the court may not affirm the decision by applying the
proper legal standard. The court must reverse and remand, directing the agency to
apply the proper legal standard."); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 364
(5th ed. 2009) ("[An] important corollar[y] of the Chenery principal.... concerns the
appropriate remedy when an agency decision cannot be supported on the grounds
advanced by the agency. The usual remedy is to remand the case back to the agency
for further consideration rather than to reverse the agency outright."); Henry J.
Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Ordes,
1969 DuKE L.J. 199, 205 ("Chenery would have required the district court to reverse
and remand, since it could not know whether the Commission acting on a proper
view of the law might not have arrived at [a different result] even though not required
to do so."); PatrickJ. Glen, "To Remand, or Not to Remand". Ventura's OrdinaryRemand
Rule and the EvolvingJurisprudence of Futility, 10 RiCH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1, 8 (2010)
("The 'remand rule' of the Chenery cases seems absolute in scope. If the agency has
not yet rendered a decision on the relevant issue, or has committed an error in reaching its disposition, a reviewing court cannot affirm or deny the appeal and must
remand for an agency decision in the first instance, or an agency decision freed of the
underlying error.").
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The Supreme Court has reaffirmed these principles in a variety of
settings. 9 And, as one would expect, federal courts uniformly apply
Cheneiy when reviewing agency decisions-including Social Security
disability determinations. 10 In fact, each circuit court of appeals'1 has
invoked Chenery in a Social Security disability case without discussing
its applicability. 12 But the Supreme Court has not spoken as to
9 See, e.g., INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (invoking Chenery
in a case involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service); NLRB v. Ky. River
Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721, 722 n.3 (2001) (invoking Chenery in a case involving the National Labor Relations Board); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (invoking Chenery in a case involving the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 508, 520 (1979) (invoking Chenery in a case involving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974) (invoking Chenery in a case involving
the Interstate Commerce Commission); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S.
380, 397 (1974) (invoking Chenery in a case involving the Federal Power Commission);
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1972) (invoking Chenery in a
case involving the Federal Trade Commission).
10 See, e.g., McClesky v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 2010); Simpson v.
Comm'r of Social Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 192 (6th Cir. 2009); Cortes v. Comm'r of
Social Sec., 255 F. App'x 646, 653 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d
1166, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2007); Barbera v. Barnhart, 151 F. App'x 31, 33 (2d Cir.
2005); Brun v. Barnhart, 126 F. App'x 495 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Butler v.
Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 1002 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140,
1145 (10th Cir. 2004); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001); Banks
v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 2001); Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d
Cir. 1999); Scott v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1994); Berryhill v. Shalala, 4 F.3d
993, 1993 WL 361792, at *6-7 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision); Gonzalez
Maldonado v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 1209, 1993 WL 243350, at *4
(1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); Ceguerra v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d
703, 708 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Mem'l Hosp. of Carbondale v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 771,
778 (7th Cir. 1985); Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (lth Cir. 1984); Cunningham v. Harris, 658 F.2d 239, 244 n.3 (4th Cir. 1981); Combs v. Weinberger, 501
F.2d 1361, 1363 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Celebrezze v. Wifstad, 314 F.2d 208,
218 (8th Cir. 1963).
11 Except the Federal Circuit, which does not hear Social Security cases. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
12 See supra note 10. In an unpublished decision, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit-without significant discussion-raised the
issue of whether Chenery should apply in the Social Security disability context. See
Powell v. Barnhart, 69 F. App'x 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2003); see also infra Part III (discussing the issues raised in Powell). But the court declined to decide the issue after
finding that Chenery had not been implicated in the case. Powell, 69 F. App'x at 411.
The Tenth Circuit subsequently applied Chenery in Social Security disability cases without discussing Powell or Chenery's applicability. See, e.g., Cobb v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x
445, 450 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Chenery); Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1207-08
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whether these principles extend to the Social Security disability setting,1 3 and careful examination of the Social Security Act's judicial
review provisions 14 indicates these principles may not apply in that
context.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants a reviewing court the "power to enter,
upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 15 Thus, the plain language of the statute appears to contradict
Chenery's remand requirement. 16 Moreover, § 4 0 5 (g) takes the courts
outside of "their accustomed role as external overseers of the administrative process,"1 7 and instead makes them "virtual[ ] . . . coparticipants in the process, exercising ground-level discretion of the same
order as that exercised by [administrative lawjudges] and the Appeals
Council."' 8 It follows, then, that a Social Security decision may not be
a "determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make."' 9
The remand process places a burden on both the agency and the
courts by forcing each to reconsider cases where the eventual outcome should be clear. Therefore, if Chenery does not apply in Social
(10th Cir. 2007) (same); Maynard v. Astrue, 276 F. App'x 726, 732 (10th Cir. 2007)
(same); Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1175 (same); Dye v. Barnhart, 180 F. App'x 27, 31 (10th
Cir. 2006) (same); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005) (same);
Allen, 357 F.3d at 1145 (same).
13 Justice Rehnquist, acting as a CircuitJustice, authored an in-chambers opinion
granting a stay in which he indicated that he would observe the Chenery principles in
the social security setting. See Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333 (1983) (RehnquistJ., in-chambers opinion) ("[f] n the absence of substantial justification for doing
other-wise, a reviewing court may not after determining that additional evidence is
requisite for adequate review, proceed by dictating to the agency the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and ordering the results to be
reported to the court without opportunity for further consideration on the basis of
the new evidence by the agency. Such a procedure clearly runs the risk of 'propel[ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the
administrative agency.' (alterations in original) (quoting FPC v. Transcon. Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976), which in turn quoted Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194,
196 (1947))). Although Justice Rehnquist did not speak on behalf of the full Court,
this appears to be the closest the Court has come to applying Chenery in the Social
Security disability setting.
14 42 U.S.C. § 40 5 (g) (2006).
15 Id. (emphasis added). For the full text of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see infta App. A.
16 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17 Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885 (1989) (quotingJERRY L. MASHAW ET AL.,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS

18
19

133 (1978)).

Id.
Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (emphasis added).
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Security disability cases, wasteful remands can be avoided. This would
alleviate congestion in the federal courts and reduce the tension
between the courts and the Social Security Administration, as courts
could enforce their precedents directly.
This Note explores Chenery's applicability in Social Security disability cases. Part I tracks the development of Chenery and its progeny.
Part II analyzes the Social Security Act's judicial review provisions and
compares them with those typically found in other statutes underlying
Chenery's application. Part III explores the legal arguments for and
against applying Chenery in Social Security disability cases. It begins
with the implicit arguments raised in dicta by the Tenth Circuit in
Powell v. Barnhart,20 before moving on to analyze § 405(g)'s "with or
without remanding" clause. Finally, the Note concludes by suggesting
courts should confront the text of § 4 05 (g), rather than "mechanically
import[ing the principles of Chenery and its progeny] into the particu21
lar context of social security disability proceedings."
I.

CHENERY AND ITS PROGENY

A.

Chenery I

Chenery I involved a group of corporate "officers, directors, and
controlling stockholders" 22 (Directors) who purchased preferred
stock 23 in a controlled subsidiary while that subsidiary's reorganization was pending before the SEC. 24 Although the Commission found

no fraud or failure to disclose on the part of the Directors, it concluded that they "were fiduciaries and hence under a 'duty of fair
dealing' not to trade in the securities of the corporation while plans
25
for its reorganization were before the Commission."
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the Directors occupied positions of trust, but it disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of fiduciary law. 2 6 And because the Commission based its
decision solely on the laws of equity, the laws of equity were the only
20
21

69 F. App'x 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2003).
See id.

22

Chenery ,318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943).

23 Preferred stock is "[a class of stock giving its holder a preferential claim to
dividends and to corporate assets upon liquidation but that [usually] carries no voting
rights." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1553 (9th ed. 2009).
24 See Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 81-85. The subsidiary company was organized under
the Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed 2005). See Chenery I, 318
U.S. at 81.
25 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81.
26 See id. at 85-90.
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basis upon which the Commission's decision could be judged. 27
Thus, the Chenery doctrine was born: "The grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record
28
discloses that its action was based."

The Court explained this rule by analogizing to judicial review of
lower court decisions. 29 A reviewing court must affirm a lower court's
decision if it reaches the correct result, even if "the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." 30 This rule makes
sense because "[i] t would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower
court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the
appellate court concluded should properly be based on another
ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate." 3' If,
however, the lower court's decision rests "upon a determination of
fact which only a jury could make but which has not been made, the
'32
appellate court cannot take the place of the jury.
Similarly, if an administrative order relies on "a determination of
policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and
which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do
service for an administrative judgment."3 3 Thus, "[f] or purposes of
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot
intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to
34
an administrative agency."
Applying this rule, the SEC's order could not stand. 3 5 The Directors were under no fiduciary duty to avoid buying and selling the corporation's stock simply because they were officers and directors of the
corporation. 36 This did not mean, however, that the Commission
could not prevent the transactions. Congress gave the SEC broad
power to protect the public interest. 37 Therefore, "[h]ad the Commission, acting upon its experience and peculiar competence,
promulgated a general rule of which its order . . .was a particular

application, the problem for [the Court's] consideration would be
very different." 38 Because the SEC chose not to rely on its statutory
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See
See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 87.
id.
id. at 88.
(quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)).

34

Id.

35
36
37
38

See id.
Id.
See id. at 90.
Id. at 92.
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authority-and instead relied on an incorrect interpretation of the
laws of equity-the Court remanded the case so the agency could
39
exercise its delegated discretion.
B.

SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11)40

On remand, the SEC again refused to allow the Directors to benefit from the transactions. 41 This time, however, the agency took the
Court's hint4 2 and grounded its decision in statutory authority. 43 As
the Court noted on appeal, "[t]he latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of relying on judicial precedents which do
not sustain it. This time . . . the Commission has concluded that the
proposed transaction is inconsistent with the standards of . . . the
[Public Utility Holding Company] Act."'44 Moreover, " [i] t has drawn
heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its
order. '45 For those reasons, the Court upheld the Commission's
46
order.
The second Chenery opinion is a landmark in administrative law
because of its holding that an agency may choose between rulemaking
and adjudication when announcing its policies. 47 For purposes of this
Note, though, it is notable mostly for its explication of Chenery .48
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a
reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which
an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge
the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the
agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it
considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would
39 See id. at 92-95.
40 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
41 See id. at 198-99.
42 See id. at 199; see also Friendly, supra note 8, at 203 ("Any lawyer worth his salt
would have placed a rather large bet that the SEC would avail itself of the invitation
the Supreme Court had extended; and so, of course, it did.").
43 See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 199.
44

Id.

45
46

Id.
See id. at 209.

47

See id. at 199-204;

WILLIAM

F. Fox,

§ 6.03, at 144 (5th ed. 2008).
48 See Friendly, supra note 8, at 203.
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propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside
49
exclusively for the administrative agency.
C. Chenery's Progeny
The Court has refined Chenery's principles since handing down its
original decisions in the 1940s. In Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States,50 the Court faced what has become the typical situation involving Chenery; government counsel argued on appeal that the agency's
51
decision should be affirmed on grounds not set forth in its order.
The Court refused the invitation, stating that "courts may not accept
appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action; Chenery
requires that an agency's discretionary order be upheld, if at all, on
the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself. '5 2 To substitute a court's discretion for an agency's would undermine the
53
orderly function of judicial review.
These principles were further explained in ICC v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers.54 There, the concurrence argued that Chenery
required a remand because the ICC erred in explaining its decision. 5 5
The majority, however, found that Chenery did not apply because the
agency's decision was unreviewable under the relevant statute:5 6 "Chenery has nothing whatever to do with whether agency action is reviewable.
It does not establish ...the principle that if the agency gives a 'reviewable' reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes
reviewable." 5 7 Rather, Chenery stands for the notion that a court "may
not affirm on a basis containing any element of discretion-including
discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities-that is not
the basis the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary
58
judgment from the agency to the court."

49
50
51

Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196.
371 U.S. 156 (1962).
See id. at 168.

52
53

Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 169.

54
55
56
57

482 U.S. 270 (1987).
See id. at 291 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
See id. at 282-83 (majority opinion).
Id. at 283.

58

Id.
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Futility and Harmless Error

Perhaps the biggest source of uncertainty surrounding Chenery's
applicability lies in the area of futility and harmless error analysis. 59 In
60
Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates v. United States,
the Court reviewed a Maritime Commission decision that did not
clearly identify its source of statutory authority. 6 1 The petitioners
argued that the Commission's failure to state its basis of authority rendered its decision invalid under Cheney.62 But the Court was not persuaded. It agreed with the district court that there was "not 'the
slightest ground for assuming"' that the result would have been any
63
different had the Commission been clear on its authority.
Moreover,
[Cheneiy and its progeny were] aimed at assuring that initial administrative determinations are made with relevant criteria in mind and
in a proper procedural manner; when a mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used
or the substance of decision reached, as in this instance (assuming
there was such a mistake), the sought extension of the cases cited
64
would not advance the purpose they were intended to serve.
A reviewing court, therefore, is not required to remand every
time an agency makes a mistake. Rather, a remand is required only
when there is a strong possibility the agency would have reached a
65
different conclusion without the error.
A plurality of the Court reasserted this principle a few years later
in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 66 There, the Court upheld a NLRB
order even though the order relied upon a rule improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .67 Justice
Harlan, in dissent, argued that Chenery required the Court to
remand. 68 Justice Fortas, however, responded that remanding "would
59 See generally Friendly, supra note 8 (analyzing Chenery and its progeny along
with futility considerations); Glen, supra note 8 (analyzing Chenery and its progeny
with a focus on the developing jurisprudence of futility).
60 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
61 See id. at 245-46.
62 See id. at 246.
63 See id. at 247 (quoting Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 202
F. Supp. 297, 305 (D. Mass. 1962), amended by 210 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd,
312 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1963), affd, 377 U.S. 235 (1964)).
64 Id. at 248.
65 See Friendly, supra note 8, at 211.
66 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion).
67 See id. at 762-66.
68 See id. at 783 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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be an idle and useless formality." 69 Indeed, " Chenery does not require
[the Court to] convert judicial review of agency action into a pingpong game.... [T] he substance of the Board's command is not seriously contestable. There is not the slightest uncertainty as to the out,"70 Thus, "[i] t would be
come of a proceeding before the Board.
'7
meaningless to remand." '

After Wyman-Gordon, there could be little doubt about the existence of a futility exception to the Chenery doctrine. But such an
exception, based on a court's relative level of certainty regarding the
outcome of a potential remand, invites difficulty in defining the circumstances that warrant a futility determination. The Court con72
fronted this issue-albeit not explicitly-in INS v. Orlando Ventura.
The Ordinary Remand Rule

2.

Ventura involved review of an INS decision to deny asylum based
on "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
...[a] political opinion."7 3 The immigration judge ruled that conditions in the applicant's home country had improved "to the point
where no realistic threat of persecution currently existed."7 4 But the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not consider this argument
in reaching its decision.7 5 Instead, it denied the application because
any persecution the applicant suffered was not "on account of a political
opinion."76
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the BIA had not
determined whether changed circumstances had precluded a reasonable fear of persecution.7 7 And it admitted that a reviewing court generally should remand so the agency can make such a determination in
the first instance. 78 Nevertheless, it believed remand was unnecessary
if "it [was] clear that [the court] would be compelled to reverse the
79
BIA's decision if the BIA decided the matter against the applicant."
69
70

See id. at 766 n.6 (plurality opinion).
Id.

71

Id.

72

537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam).

73 Id. at 13 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (Supp. V
2000) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (2006))).
74

Id.

75
76

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

77

Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150, 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd in part, 537

U.S. 12 (2002).
78 See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 15; Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157.
79

Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157.
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After concluding the record evidence was insufficient to rebut "the
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution," the court
80
decided not to remand.
The Supreme Court began its review by reiterating Chenery's command that courts must refrain from "intrud[ing] upon the domain
which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency."8 1 It also stressed that a reviewing court "is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being
reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an
inquiry."8 2 Thus, "the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is
to remand to the agency"8 3 so the agency can "bring its expertise to

84
bear upon the matter."
With these principles in mind, the Court provided two ways in
which the Ninth Circuit had "committed clear error. '8 5 First, the
Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded there was insufficient evidence to
find that changed circumstances had precluded a reasonable fear of
political persecution.8 6 Second, by failing to remand, the Ninth Circuit foreclosed the compilation of additional evidence that may have
helped determine the changed circumstances issue. In other words,
the process would have benefitted from allowing the BIA to "bring its
expertise to bear upon the matter" of collecting and evaluating the
evidence.8 7 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, "should have applied the
ordinary 'remand' rule."88

80 Id.
81 See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16 (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).
82 See id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
83 Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744).
84 Id. at 17.
85 See id. at 16-17.
86 See id. at 17-18.
87 See id.
88 Id. at 18. The Court revisited this issue four years later in Gonzales v. Thomas,
547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam). Once again, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the agency had not adequately addressed a material question-whether a family
could constitute a "particular social group" under refugee statutes. See Thomas v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated, 547 U.S. 183
(2006); Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004), affd en banc sub nom.
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). But
instead of remanding the question to the BIA, the court ruled that a family can be a
"particular social group" and that the respondent's family was targeted for abuse
because they were members of such a group. See Thomas, 409 F.3d at 1187-89.
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, stating that "[t]he
Ninth Circuit's failure to remand is legally erroneous, and that error is 'obvious in
light of Ventura,' itself a summary reversal." Thomas, 547 U.S. at 185 (citing Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (No. 05-552)). After comparing the
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Current Rule of Chenery and its Progeny

After Ventura, the principles of Chenery I and its progeny may
89
fairly be summarized as follows: "[E]xcept in rare circumstances,"
those where there can be no doubt about the outcome of an agency's
decision upon remand,90 a reviewing court may not make a discretionary determination 9 a that an "agency alone [has been] authorized to
make." 92 Rather, a court must ordinarily remand 93 to an agency if the
agency has erred in reaching its decision 94 or has failed to make a
95
material determination.
II.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

AND JUDICIAL REVIEW STATUTES

To understand how § 405(g) might affect the application of Chenery and its progeny, one must understand how the statute's provisions
govern judicial review in Social Security disability cases. Although it is
beyond the scope of this Note to provide a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between statutes and administrative judicial
review, a brief overview is in order.
A.

Special Statutory Review Provisions

Congress enacted the APA9 6 in 1946 in order "to systematize
administrative law on a government-wide basis."'9 7 And under the
facts to those in Ventura, the Court found "no special circumstance [s] ... that might
have justified the Ninth Circuit's determination of the matter in the first instance."
Id. at 185-87. Thus, the Court held that "as in Ventura, the Court of Appeals should
have applied the 'ordinary "remand" rule.'" Id. at 187 (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at

18).
89 Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,
744 (1985)).
90 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality
opinion).
91 See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987).
92 Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Chenery 1, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
93 See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 18.
94 See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196; Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94-95; Glen, supra note 8,
at 8 ("If the agency has not yet rendered a decision on the relevant issue, or has
committed an error in reaching its disposition, a reviewing court cannot affirm or
deny the appeal and must remand for an agency decision in the first instance, or an
agency decision freed of the underlying error.").
95 See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985)); Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 88.
96 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
97 LAWSON, supra note 8, at 202.
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APA, agency actions are presumed to be reviewable by the courts.9 8
The judicial review provisions of the APA, codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706, set forth the default conditions and procedures governing review of agency actions. 99 The term "default," however, is
used because these provisions apply only to the extent judicial review
is not governed by other statutes; if Congress has provided for judicial
review in another statute, that "statutory road to review becomes the
only road."1 00 Most organic statutes, 10' in fact, contain "special statutory review" provisions that specify how and when one may obtain
02
judicial review of agency actions.'
Typically, these special statutory review provisions are modeled
after the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,103 which provided
judicial review by way of actions brought directly in the circuit courts
of appeals. 10 4 It also outlined the process by which the parties could
petition for review, and gave courts the "power to make and enter
upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in [the transcript of the record] a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside
the order of the commission."' 0 5 The Commission's findings of fact
were to be conclusive if supported by the evidence. 10 6 And the court
possessed the power, upon application by either party, to order the
98 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("[T]he Administrative
Procedure Act... embodies the basic presumption ofjudicial review to one 'suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute,' so long as no statute precludes such
relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion." (citation omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. 11 1967)) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)); see also 3
RicI-ARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATPvE LAW TREATISE § 17.6 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing
the presumption of reviewability of agency decisions).
99 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
100 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.3, at 439 (2d ed. 1984); see also
5 U.S.C. § 703 ("The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory
review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in
the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action .. .in a court
of competent jurisdiction."); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411, 420 (1965) ("[W]here Congress has provided statutory review procedures designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular
problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.").
101 An organic statute is "[a] law that establishes an administrative agency or local
government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1544 (9th ed. 2009).
102 See LAwsoN, supra note 8, at 814.
103 Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 720-21 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(2006)).
104 See id.; ScHwARTz, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.
105 See § 5, 38 Stat. at 720.
106 See id.
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Commission to gather additional evidence. 10 7 The Commission, then,
could modify its findings and recommend how the court should rule
on its original order. 10 8 Finally, the court's judgment was to be conclusive absent a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. 10 9
Before 1950, a number of agency statutes provided for judicial
review by three-judge panels in the district courts."10 The Judicial
Review Act of 1950,111 however, replaced that practice with Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)-style review for all of those agencies but the
ICC; and the ICC was given FTC-style review by 1975.112 Although
most agency statutes now provide judicial review by way of the circuit
courts, at least one notable exception exists; 13 the Social Security Act
provides judicial review by way of civil actions filed in the district
courts.114

B.

42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g)

The special statutory review provisions of the Social Security Act,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), differ from typical FTC-style review
provisions in four subtle ways. 115 First, as noted above, judicial review
of a Social Security determination takes place via a civil action filed
initially in the district court, which provides an additional layer ofjudicial review. 116 Second, § 405(g) adds the clause "with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing"'
107
108
109
110
111

17

to the typical description of a

See id.
See id.
See id.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.
Ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28, 50

U.S.C.).
112 SeeAct ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, § 5, 88 Stat. 1917 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 2321 (2006)); SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.
113 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g) (2006); SCHWARTz, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.
115 This section focuses on identifying the differences between the statutory provisions contained in § 4 0 5 (g) and those contained in typical statutes providing FTCstyle review. The significance of these differences will be probed further infra in Parts

III and IV.
116

See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) ("Such action shall be brought in the district court of

the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his
principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of
business within any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia,").

117 See id. ("The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, ajudgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.").
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court's power to affirm, modify, or reverse an agency's decision. 118
Third, the Social Security Act gives the court the discretion to remand
to the agency "on motion of the Commissioner of Social Security
made for good cause shown," at any point before the agency files its
answer. 119 Finally, § 4 0 5 (g) allows the court, on its own motion, to
order that "additional evidence . . . be taken before the Commissioner"; 120 whereas, typical FTC-style statutes allow such remands only
12 1
upon motion of a party.
Unfortunately, Congress did not explain its decision to vary the
Social Security Act's provisions in this manner. Originally enacted in
12 3
1935,122 the Act did not contain any provisions for judicial review.

The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 (SSAA),124 however,
remedied this deficiency by introducing the provisions now embodied
in § 405(g).125 Although the legislative history of the SSAA does not
118 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006) ("Upon such filing of the petition the court
shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein concurrently with the Commission until the filing of the record and shall have power to
make and enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed and to issue
such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgement to prevent injury to the public or to competitors pendente lite.").
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The court may, on motion of the Commissioner of
Social Security made for good cause shown before the Commissioner files the Commissioner's answer, remand the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further action by the Commissioner of Social Security, and it may at any time order
additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security ... .
120 See id.
121 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (FTC) ("If either party shall apply to the court for
leave to adduce additional evidence. . . the court may order such additional evidence
to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing.. .

.");

15

U.S.C. § 78y(a) (5) (SEC) ("If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce
additional evidence ... the court may remand the case to the Commission for further
proceedings .

. . .");

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (Fed. Power Comm'n (FPC)) ("If any party

shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence . . . the court may
order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission. .. ."); 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (2006) (NLRB) ("If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce
additional evidence . . . the court may order such additional evidence to be taken
before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the
record.").
122 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397).
123 See id.
124 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.).
125 See id. § 205(g), 53 Stat. at 1370-71 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
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reveal the meaning of specific provisions, it does provide general
background information about the language adopted:
The present provisions of the Social Security Act do not specify what
remedy, if any, is open to a claimant in the event his claim to benefits is denied by the Board. The [proposed judicial review provisions] are similar to those made for the review of decisions of many
administrative bodies. The Board's decisions on questions of law
will be reviewable, but its findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, will be conclusive.... Provision is made for remanding of
proceedings to the Board for further action, or for additional
126
evidence.
Some of the SSAA's provisions were, in fact, "similar to those
1 27
made for the review of decisions of many administrative bodies."
But the provisions outlined above are unusual. Indeed, it appears that
only three statutes in force when Congress adopted the SSAA
included a "with or without remanding" clause. 128 Of the three, only
two have the potential to provide insight into why Congress included
129
the clause in the SSAA.
126 H.R. REP. No. 76-728, at 43 (1939); S. REP. No. 76-734, at 52 (1939). The
utility of examining legislative history in matters of statutory interpretation is, of
course, the subject of great debate. See 4 CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 11:33, at 153 (3d ed. 2010). Legislative history is presented here for
the benefit of those who find such evidence persuasive.
127 S. REP. No. 76-734, at 52.
128 See Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, ch. 680, § 5(f), 52 Stat. 1094,
1100-01 (1938) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 355(f) (2006)) ("[The court] shall
have power to enter upon the pleadings and transcript of the record a decree
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the cause for rehearing."); Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 906(g), 49 Stat. 1648,
1750 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7482(c)(1) (2006)) (giving courts reviewing IRS
decisions the power to "affirm the decision of the Board, or to modify or reverse such
decision, if it is not in accordance with law, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing, asjustice may require"); Act of Aug. 21, 1935, ch. 597, § 3, 49 Stat. 670, 671
(providing that courts reviewing Secretary of War decisions regarding the regulation
of tolls on bridges of navigable waterways had the "power to affirm or, if the order its
[sic] not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the order, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing asjustice may require" (footnote omitted explaining that mistake was in the original)). These statutes were identified using an
advanced U.S. Code search on Hein Online looking for all code provisions containing
the language "with or without remanding" from 1936 to 1940. The identified code
provisions were then traced back to their enacting statutes.
129 Although section 906(g) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. at 1750, contains
no useful legislative history, the "with or without remanding" language in that statute
appears to have been taken from section 1003(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
44 Stat. 9, 110, which does have relevant legislative history. Section 3 of the Act of
Aug. 21, 1935, 49 Stat. at 670, does not have legislative history explaining its "with or
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Section 9 0 6 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1936130

Section 9 0 6 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1936 has no legislative history explaining its "with or without remanding" provision. Nevertheless, its provision is remarkably similar to-and is almost certainly
derived from-the "with or without remanding" provision in section
1003(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926,131 which does have relevant legislative history. Section 1003(b) provides that "courts shall have power
to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law,
to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require."1 32 The
original draft language of section 1003(b), however, stated that
courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is
not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of
the Board, or if there has been prejudicial error by the Board in
ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, to remand the case to the
shall a case be
Board for rehearing; but on no other ground
33
remanded for the taking of further evidence.1
Although the 1926 Act's legislative history is not a model of clarity, it indicates that Congress intended the provision to limit the scope
of a court's review to matters of law, thus giving deference to agency
findings of fact and evidentiary rulings.' 34 The Senate, however,
135 So it
objected to the limiting nature of the remand provision.
without remanding" provision. And unlike section 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. at 1100-01, section 3 of the Act of Aug. 21, 1935 is no
more similar to § 4 05(g) of the Social Security Act than is section 1003(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1926. Thus, the Act of Aug. 21, 1935 is not particularly useful to this
analysis.
130 § 9 06(g), 49 Stat. at 1750 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7482(c) (1)).
131 Compare id. ("[S] uch court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm the decision of the Board, or to modify or reverse such decision, if it is not in accordance with
law, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing, as justice may require."),
with § 1003(b), 44 Stat. at 110 ("[S]uch courts shall have power to affirm or, if the
decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may
require.").
132 § 1003(b), 44 Stat. at 110.
133 SeeJ.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAws,
1938-1861, at 663 (1938).
134 See S. REP. No. 69-52, at 36-37 (1926) ("In view of the grant of exclusive power
to the board finally to determine the facts upon which tax liability is based, [this
section] limits the review on appeal to what are commonly known as questions of
law."); SEIDMAN, supra note 133, at 663-64.
135 See H.R. REP. No. 69-356, at 1, 54-55 (1926); SEIDMAN, supra note 133, at
663-64. Given the language the Senate replaced, and what it replaced that language
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introduced Amendment 155, striking the language dealing with evidence, and replacing it with the clause "with or without remanding
the case for a rehearing, as justice may require." 13 6 The House ultimately agreed, and the phrase "with or without remanding" was incor13 7
porated into the final version of the Act.
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the intended meaning
of the "with or without remanding" clause in the SSAA based on the
Revenue Act of 1926's legislative history. The 1926 Act's clause
appears to address the Senate's concern that a reviewing court would
not have the flexibility to remand for additional evidence.1 3 8 But the
SSAA's evidentiary remand provisions specifically addressed that concern. Thus, one cannot assume Congress intended the SSAA's "with
or without remanding" provision to serve the same function it served
in the Revenue Act of 1926.
D. Section 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) 3 9
After two unsuccessful attempts to create a benefits system for
railroad workers, 140 Congress enacted the Railroad Retirement Act of
1937141 and the RUIA in 1938.142 The Supreme Court has described
the Railroad Retirement Act as "a Social Security Act for employees of
common carriers.' 4 3 And given the statutory schemes' similar purposes, it is unsurprising that the SSAA's judicial review provisions bear
a striking resemblance to those adopted in the RUIA. 144 Indeed, all
but one of the unique features of § 4 0 5 (g) outlined above is also prewith, it is fair to infer that the Senate was concerned with limiting the court's flexibility to remand for the taking of further evidence.
136 See H.R. REP. No. 69-356, at 54-55; SEIDMAN, supra note 133, at 663-64.
137 See H.R. REP. No. 69-356, at 1, 54-55.
138 See supra note 135.
139 Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, ch. 680, § 5(f), 52 Stat. 1094, 1100-01
(1938) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 355(f) (2006)).
140 See Railroad Retirement Act of 1935, ch. 812, 49 Stat. 967 (amended 1937);
Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934), invalidated by R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).
141 Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307 (current version at 45
U.S.C. §§ 231-231v (2006)).
142 52 Stat. 1094 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 355-369).
143 Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963) (per curiam) (quoting
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Leary, 204 F.2d 461, 468 (1st Cir. 1953)).
144 Compare Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379,
§ 205(g), 53 Stat. 1360, 1370-71 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006)) (providing review in the district courts; granting the power to affirm, modify, or reverse,
"with or without remanding"; and allowing the court to remand for further evidence
on its own motion), with § 5(f), 52 Stat. at 1100-01 (same).
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sent in the RUIA; the only exception being that there are no RUIA
provisions allowing the agency to request remand before filing its
answer.145 Unfortunately, the RULA's legislative history is just as silent
as the SSAA's as to why Congress chose to stray from typical FTC-style
agency review. 14 6 This leaves us back where we began-knowing that
§ 405(g) is unusual among special statutory review provisions, but not
knowing why.
III.

SECTION

4 05(g)'s EFFECT ON THE APPLICATION OF CHENERY
AND ITS PROGENY

Thus far, it has been established that (1) Chenery imposes a
147
remand rule on courts conducting judicial review of agency action;
(2) Congress ultimately determines the procedures courts must follow
4 05
(g) is unusual
when conducting such judicial review; 1 48 and (3) §
among the special statutory review provisions governing such judicial
review. 1 49 This Note now turns to exploring whether § 405(g) alters
Chenery's application in Social Security disability cases. It begins by
discussing the implicit arguments raised in dicta by the Tenth Circuit
in Powell v. Barnhart,150 before moving on to analyze § 405(g)'s "with
or without remanding" clause.
A.

Powell v. Barnhart

In 2003, the Tenth Circuit questioned in dicta whether Chenery
should apply in Social Security disability cases: "[W] e have no occasion to decide whether the principles of Chenery and its progeny,
developed in other administrative review settings, should be mechanically imported into the particular context of social security disability
145

See § 5(f), 52 Stat. at 1100-01.

146 There are only two references to the judicial review provisions in the available
committee reports, and neither is helpful. See RailroadUnemployment Insurance System:
Hearings on H.R. 10127 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 196 (1938) ("[T] he determinations of the Board with respect to any
claim for benefits or refund shall be binding upon all persons, including the Comptroller General and any other administrative or accounting officer, employee or agent
of the United States, and shall not be subject to review in any manner other than that
set forth in subsection (f) of this section (which relates to appeals to the courts from
decisions of the Board)."); H.R. REP. No. 75-2668, § 5, at 7 (1938) ("Subsection (f)
sets forth the procedure for appeal to the courts from final decisions of the Board.").
147 See supra Part I.
148 See supra Part II.A.
149 See supra Part II.B.
150 69 F. App'x 405 (10th Cir. 2003).
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proceedings."' 5 1 Citing two Supreme Court decisions, the Tenth Circuit chose not to flesh out its argument questioning Chenery's application. This section, then, discusses the cases cited in Powell and
attempts to draw out its implicit argument against Chenery's
application.

1.

Sullivan v. Hudson152

In Hudson, the Court decided whether a Social Security claimant
could be awarded attorney's fees 1 53 after prevailing on remand from
the district court.' 5 4 Hudson's facts and holding are not relevant to
this analysis, but its discussion of § 4 05 (g) is instructive. After quoting
the pertinent provisions of § 40 5 (g), the Court offered this
observation:
As provisions forjudicial review of agency action go, § 4 05(g) is
somewhat unusual. The detailed provisions for the transfer of proceedings from the courts to the Secretary and for the filing of the
Secretary's subsequent findings with the court suggest a degree of
direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative
agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the
1 55
Administrative Procedure Act.
The Court then quoted this description of § 405(g)'s effect:
"The remand power places the courts, not in their accustomed
role as external overseers of the administrative process, making sure
that it stays within legal bounds, but virtually as coparticipants in the
process, exercising ground-level discretion of the same order as that
exercised by [administrative law judges] and the Appeals Council
when they act upon a request to reopen a decision on the basis of
56
new and material evidence.'
Finally, the court discussed the extent of the interaction between
the courts and the agency on remand.' 57 It stated, for example, that
"[w]here a court finds that the Secretary has committed a legal or
factual error in evaluating a particular claim, the district court's
151 See id. at 411 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[A]s we have reached this conclusion within
the analytical confines of the [administrative law judge's] rationale of decision, the
concerns [the claimant] raises about post hocjustification of administrative action are
not implicated by our disposition." (citation to Chenery 1, 318 U.S. 80 (1943)
omitted)).
152 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
153 See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
154 Hudson, 490 U.S. at 879.

155
156
157

Id. at 885.
Id. (quoting MAsHAw
See id. at 885-86.

ET AL.,

supra note 17, at 133).
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remand order will often include detailed instructions concerning the
scope of the remand, the evidence to be adduced, and the legal or
factual issues to be addressed." 158 And deviating from the court's
remand order would itself be legal error, which might subject the
agency's decision to reversal on further review. 159 Thus, a court frequently retains jurisdiction on remand in order to ensure that the
agency follows its instructions. 160
2.

61
Sims v. Apfe11

In Sims, the Court determined that the administrative issue

16 2
It
exhaustion rule does not apply in Social Security disability cases.

began by noting that there are no issue exhaustion requirements in
either the Social Security Act or the Social Security Administration's
regulations. 16 3 It also noted that the reasons why courts generally
impose issue exhaustion in the absence of a statutory or regulatory
mandate do not apply in Social Security disability cases. 164 This is
because the necessity for administrative issue exhaustion relates
directly to how much an administrative adjudication resembles an
adversarial adjudication in a trial court: "Where the parties are
expected to develop the issues in an adversarial administrative proceeding,.., the rationale for requiring issue exhaustion is at its greatest."1 65 But when "an administrative proceeding is not adversarial,...
the reasons for a court to require issue exhaustion are much
weaker."

166

The Court went on to explain that "[t]he differences between
courts and agencies are nowhere more pronounced than in Social
Security proceedings.' 1

67

Unlike other agency adjudicative processes,

Social Security proceedings do not follow the typical adversarial
model of judicial decision making.1 68 Rather, these proceedings are
inquisitorial in nature.1 69 The administrative law judge (ALJ) has a
"duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
See id.
530 U.S. 103 (2000).
See id. at 104-05.
See id. at 107-08.
See id. at 109-10.
Id. at 110.
Id.

167

Id. (plurality opinion).

168
169

See id.
See id. at 110-11.
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against granting benefits, and the Council's review is similarly
broad. '170 Further, the Social Security Commissioner does not have
representation at the proceedings to argue against awarding benefits. 1 7 1 Because the proceedings do not rely on the parties to develop
the issues, it makes no sense to require claimants to administratively
172
exhaust all issues before obtaining judicial review.
3.

Powell's Implicit Argument Against Chenery's Application

The potential Chenery implications of the Court's description of
§ 4 0 5 (g) in Hudson are apparent. If § 4 0 5 (g) alters the traditional
role of the courts "as external overseers of the administrative process,"
and essentially makes them "coparticipants in the process," 173 then
Social Security disability decisions may not be "determination [s] or
judgment[s] which an administrative agency alone is authorized to
make. 1 74 Instead, Social Security decisions may be seen as determinations or judgments that the court and agency together are empowered
to make. If that's true, Chenery's warning that a reviewing court must
avoid entering "the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted
to an administrative agency" 175 would not be implicated.
While some might view this as a formalistic approach to interpreting the language of Chenery and Hudson, it is consistent with the functional goals of Chenery. The Court in Chenery feared judicial intrusion
upon decisions Congress entrusted solely to agencies. But this concern, likely grounded in separation of powers, applies only if Congress
does not intend for an agency to share its legal decision-making discretion with the courts. If § 405(g)-properly understood-allows
the courts to "exercis[e] ground-level discretion of the same order as
that exercised by ALJs and the Appeals Council," 176 then judicial
review under § 405(g) should be seen as just another layer in a shared
decision-making process.
Sims bolsters this view. Judicial review provides the only opportunity for Social Security parties to develop the issues in an adversarial
proceeding. Thus, Congress appears to be using the courts as an
adversarial counter to the agency's inquisitorial process. This explains
why Congress placed judicial review initially with the district courts. If
170 Id. at 111 (citation omitted).
171 Id.
172 See id. at 112.
173 Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885 (1989) (quoting MASHAW ET AL., supra
note 17, at 133).
174 Chenery 11, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (emphasis added).
175 Cheneyy 1, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (emphasis added).
176 Hudson, 490 U.S. at 885 (quoting MASHAW ET AL., supra note 17, at 133).
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the district courts act as part of the decision-making process, rather
1 77
than acting as "external overseers of the administrative process,"
then the circuit courts serve the traditional function ofjudicial review.
Whereas, under a more orthodox understanding of § 405 (g), the district courts simply provide an extra-and some might argue redundant-layer of judicial review.
Based on Hudson and Sims, then, the separation of functions
within the Social Security disability process can best be understood as
follows: the agency functions as an inquisitorial fact finder and preliminary legal decision maker, the district courts serve as adversarial issue
developers and final legal decision makers, and the circuit courts provide external review of the entire process.
4.

Counterargument

Of course, it is not necessary to take such an expansive view of
judicial discretion under § 405(g). Although the Court in Hudson
described the district courts as having "ground-level discretion of the
'1 78 it
same order as that exercised by ALJs and the Appeals Council,
did not say that the courts possessed the same type of discretion.
Indeed, a district court may require the agency to follow its "detailed
instructions concerning the scope of the remand, the evidence to be
adduced, and the legal or factual issues to be addressed,"' 79 but that
does not mean the district court is empowered to substitute its judgment for the agency's on the ultimate question of disability.
Moreover, there is evidence counseling against such a broad view
of congressional intent. In section 307 of the Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980 (SSDA) 8 0-titled
"Limitation on Court
Remands"-Congress significantly amended § 4 0 5 (g).18 1 The SSDA
placed a "good cause" limitation on the Secretary's ability to request a
remand before filing an answer.' 8 2 And although a court may still
order an evidentiary remand on its own motion at any time, the SSDA
limits this discretion by requiring "a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 183
177 Id. (quoting MASHAW ET AL., supra note 17, at 133).
178 Id. (quoting MASHAW ET AL., supra note 17, at 133).
179 Id.
180 Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 441, 458 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006)).
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); § 307, 94 Stat. at 458.
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This brings the courts' broad evidentiary remand powers closer to
184
those typically granted under FTC-style review statutes.
It should be noted, of course, that the SSDA was enacted before
the Supreme Court's description of § 4 05(g) in Hudson.185 So it is fair
to say that Hudson's broad description is instructive, even after the
limitations imposed by the SSDA. But expanding the view of judicial
power granted by § 405(g)-based on the Court's description of the
remand power in Hudson-may go against Congress's clear intention
to limit the remand power in the SSDA.
Sims does nothing to alter this analysis. The Court in Sims merely
held that it is unnecessary to require a party to exhaust all issues at the
administrative level, if that party is not responsible for developing the
issues at that level. In the absence of stronger evidence that Congress
intended to vest decision-making authority with the district courts, the
presumption should be that the agency is solely responsible for making disability determinations. If that is true, there is no reason to
think the inquisitorial nature of Social Security disability proceedings
has any effect on Chenery's relevance. It is still inappropriate for a
court to intrude upon a "domain which Congress has set aside exclu186
sively for the administrative agency."'
B.

"[W]ith or without remanding the causefor a rehearing"

Notwithstanding the force of these arguments, there is strong evidence that Congress intended to give the courts shared decision-making authority in the Social Security context. Section 4 05(g) provides
that "itihe court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
184 Compare Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379,
§ 205(g), 53 Stat. 1360, 1370-71 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5(g)) ("The court
shall, on motion of the Board made before it files its answer, remand the case to the
Board for further action by the Board, and may, at any time, on good cause shown,
order additional evidence to be taken before the Board .. "),with 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(2006) (FTC) ("If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence
is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such
evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing ...."),and § 307, 94 Stat. at 458 ("The court may, on motion of the Secretary
made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate
such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.").
185 See § 307, 94 Stat. at 458; Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 884-86 (1989).
186 See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
18 7
Whether the Cheneyy principles
remanding the cause for a rehearing."
apply in Social Security disability cases, in the end, depends on how
this clause is interpreted. This section of the Note analyses the "with
or without remanding" clause by breaking it into two parts: (1) "with
or without remanding the cause," and (2) "for a rehearing." It is
important to note that Congress adopted the provisions in § 405(g)
almost four years before the Supreme Court handed down Chenery I.
Thus, whatever interpretation is deemed the most plausible, the Chenery opinions were certainly not a factor in Congress's decision making. One should therefore be mindful not to stretch an interpretation
to conform with-nor to contradict- Chenery's principles.
1. " [W] ith or without remanding the cause"
There are four readily identifiable interpretations of § 4 05(g)'s
"with or without remanding" clause.
a.

The Truism Interpretation

One possible interpretation conforming with Chenery and its
progeny is that the "with or without remanding" clause merely states a
truism. Obviously, a reviewing court must be able to affirm the decision of the Commissioner without remanding for a rehearing. Similarly, a reviewing court must have the power to remand to an agency
so that the agency may make a determination Congress has given it
the sole authority to make. In other words, one could read the clause
as stating nothing more than the obvious.
But this interpretation is not plausible. Nothing from a grammatical standpoint indicates that the "with" in the "with or without
remanding" clause was intended to modify only the phrase "modifying, or reversing." Nor is there anything to indicate that "without"
should modify only the term "affirming."
Beyond that, however, most judicial review provisions in existence
when the SSAA was adopted-including those within contemporaneously enacted statutes-gave courts the power to affirm, modify, or
reverse agency decisions without including a "with or without remanding" clause. 1 88 Indeed, most of the statutes adopted since have not
187 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (emphasis added).
188 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(h), 52 Stat.
1040, 1053 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2006)) (FDA) ("[S]uch
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm or set aside such order."); Natural Gas
Act, ch. 556, § 19(b), 52 Stat. 821, 831-32 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
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included such a clause, and only a handful of statutes currently contain such a provision.1 89 Yet courts have never been found lacking the
statutory power to either affirm without remanding, or to remand if
necessary. One must conclude that Congress knew it did not need to
include the phrase "with or without remanding" to provide courts this
power. It is unlikely Congress knowingly adopted superfluous language in these statutes, and standard canons of statutory construction
prevent us from assuming it did so accidentally. 190 Thus, we cannot
presume the clause states nothing more than the obvious.
b.

The Futility Interpretation

Another possible interpretation that conforms with Chenery and
its progeny is that the clause allows a court to avoid remanding only in
those instances where doing so would be futile. But nothing in the
plain language of the statute limits the force of the "with or without
remanding" provision in this fashion. It is difficult to understand why
Congress would choose to exempt only a handful of statutes from
futile remand orders. Moreover, it is unlikely that it would so limit the
717r(b) (2006)) (FPC) ("[The] court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside [the] order in whole or in part."); Federal Trade Commission Act,
Amendments, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Star. 111, 111-14 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(c)) ("[T]he court ... shall have power to make and enter upon the pleadings,
evidence, and proceedings set forth in [the] transcript a decree affirming, modifying,
or setting aside the order of the Commission .... "); Public Utility Act of 1935, ch.
687, § 24(a), 49 Stat. 803, 834-35 (repealed 2005) (governing judicial review of the
SEC action at issue in Chenery and stating that the "court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside [the] order, in whole or in part").
189 There appear to be only five statutes, including the Social Security Act, currently in force containing a "with or without remanding" provision. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8902a(h) (2) (2006) (providing review of Office of Personnel Management decisions regarding government health care plans); 26 U.S.C. § 7482(c) (1) (2006) (providing review of Tax Court decisions); 33 U.S.C. § 520 (2006) (providing review of
Department of Transportation decisions regarding bridges over navigable waters); 42
U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (providing review of Social Security Administration decisions); 45
U.S.C. § 355(f) (2006) (providing review of Railroad Retirement Board decisions).
These statutes-none of which appear to have provided review in a case where the
Supreme Court invoked Chenery--were identified using a U.S.C.A. search for the term
"with or without remanding" on Westlaw.
190 See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004)
("It is... 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant."' (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.
19, 31 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute .

. . .'"

(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
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"with or without remanding" clause without providing any textual or
contextual indication of its desire to do so. This interpretation, then,
seems like an implausible attempt to harmonize the language of the
statute with Chenery and its progeny.
c.

The Reversal Interpretation

The next interpretation-that a court may avoid remanding if it
is reversing the agency's decision, but not if it is modifying or
affirming that decision-also faces plausibility objections. From a
grammatical standpoint, it is unlikely that the "with or without
remanding" clause was intended to modify only the immediately preceding phrase "reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security." Rather, the comma inserted before the clause indicates that
Congress intended the clause to modify all that preceded it within the
sentence, going back to "[tihe court shall have the power to enter."
But even if this interpretation were the most grammatically plausible, it conflicts with the principles of Chenery: "For purposes of
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot
intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to
an administrative agency." 19 1 An outright reversal of an agency's decision no less intrudes upon the agency's power to make that decision
than does affirming on grounds not stated by the agency. In each
instance, the court makes the ultimate determination rather than the
agency.

d.

The Broad Interpretation

This leaves us with the most natural interpretation of § 4 05(g): a
court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the
agency, and it may do so "with or without remanding." That this is the
most natural reading of the clause should not be controversial. This
reading does, however, call into question the application of Chenery
and its progeny.
Under this interpretation, § 4 05 (g) seems to conflict with Chenery's remand requirement. If Congress wanted courts to remand
every time they encountered an agency error, it would not have given
them the power to avoid remanding. Assuming, therefore, that the
"with or without remanding" clause grants the district courts at least
some discretion to avoid remanding, the question becomes how much
discretion Congress intended to confer.
191

See Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (emphasis added).
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Based on the legislative history and structure of § 4 05(g), it is
clear Congress wanted the courts to defer to agency factual determinations. 192 It is also clear, especially in light of the SSDA, that courts do
not have unlimited discretion to remand for additional evidence. But
Congress has not imposed any limit on a court's discretion to determine whether remand is necessary when facing erroneous or insufficient legal conclusions. Certainly, there is nothing in the text of
§ 405(g) that explicitly limits any discretion conferred by the "with or
without remanding" clause. Perhaps, then, Congress intended for the
district courts to determine whether to remand on a case-by-case basis.
Such a regime would simply work outside the domain of Chenery and
its progeny.
On this reading, § 4 0 5 (g) would permit a district court to affirm
an agency's determination that a claimant is not disabled if the evidence strongly supports that conclusion-even if the agency's reasoning is legally deficient. Or perhaps it would allow a district court to
avoid remanding if an agency has not considered a material issue, but
where the evidence strongly favors a particular outcome. Both of
these scenarios clearly conflict with the principles of Chenery. But the
most natural reading of the "with or without remanding" clause may
contemplate this kind of discretion.
Alternatively, § 405(g) can be construed to work within Chenery
when courts are presented with material issues not addressed by the
agency, while permitting courts to avoid remanding in cases where the
agency has addressed all such issues. This seems to be the approach
taken by the D.C. Circuit in Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue.193 There,
the claimant urged the court to reverse the agency's decision outright
and award disability benefits. The court stated that "Section 405 of
Title 42 expressly provides that a district court may reverse the Social
Security Administration's decision rather than remand it for further
proceedings."1 94 But the court, citing Chenery, declined to do so
because the agency had not addressed a material issue. 195 It seems,
then, that the court believed § 4 05 (g) allowed a district court to avoid
remanding for legal error, but that it nevertheless should be bound by
Chenery's other principles.

192 See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.. . ."); supra note
126 and accompanying text.
193 529 F.3d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
194 See id. at 1186 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g)).
195 Id.
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"[F] or a rehearing"

Finally, whatever force the "with or without remanding" clause
may have, the phrase "for a rehearing" may limit its application.
Although there does not seem to be any statutory or judicial definition of the term "rehearing" within the meaning of § 405(g),196 its
definition could significantly alter the application of the statute. For
example, if a court were to determine that "rehearing" literally means
"brand new administrative adjudication," the statute would not be
implicated by any remand demanding less than a full-blown administrative do-over. Of course, this would be an absurd interpretation of
the term "rehearing."1 9 7 It would allow a court to avoid remanding in
only those instances where remand is most appropriate-those where
a full reheaing is necessary.
It seems a court could define "rehearing" under the statute to
mean "any reconsideration on remand," "full-blown administrative doover," or anything in between. Therefore, a discussion of possible
interpretations would be voluminous and unhelpful. For purposes of
this Note, however, it is enough to acknowledge that a court's interpretation of the term "rehearing" can significantly affect whatever
implications § 4 05(g) may have on the application of Chenery and its
progeny. Thus, any court looking to determine § 4 0 5 (g)'s meaning
will have to wrestle with the definition of "rehearing" under the
statute.
196 The best available guide appears to come from a Court of Claims opinion
interpreting "rehearing" as used in the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(e), 44 Stat.
9, 56. See Olds & Whipple, Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 809, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1938)
("The filing of the recomputation pursuant to the order of the Board of February 27,
1935, and the submission of the cases thereon to the Board for final decision was a
rehearing within the meaning of sections 274 (e) and 272 (e) of the Revenue Acts of
1926 and 1928."). Oddly enough, this statute also uses the phrase "with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing." See § 1003(b), 44 Stat. at 110 (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 7482(c) (1) (2006)) (giving courts reviewing IRS decisions the power to
"affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to
reverse the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing,
as justice may require").
197 See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("It is true
that interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided
if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.");
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940) ("When [the
plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the act."); Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389,
394 (1940) ("All statutes must be construed in the light of their purpose. A literal
reading of them which would lead to absurd results is to be avoided when they can be
given a reasonable application consistent with their words and with the legislative
purpose.").
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CONCLUSION

One cannot question that the principles of Chenery I are wellestablished doctrine. We should presume, then, that Chenery and its
progeny apply in Social Security disability cases. But Congress determines the process by which courts conduct judicial review of agency
decisions. 198 And although 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is ambiguous, the most
natural reading of the statute conflicts with at least some of Chenery's
principles. When paired with the implicit arguments raised in Powell,
a legitimate claim can be made that the presumption of Chenery's
applicability in Social Security disability cases has been rebutted.
Adopting such an understanding would help ease congestion in the
federal courts caused by wasteful remands. It might also alleviate
some of the tension between the courts and the Social Security
Administration.
Reviewing courts should not ignore these arguments. They
should confront the text of § 405(g) and determine what, if any, discretion it confers to the district courts to avoid remanding to the
agency. If they determine that the most plausible reading of the statute conflicts with the principles of Chenery and its progeny, they
should determine the extent to which these principles might nevertheless influence decisions to remand. They should consider issues of
judicial economy and the burden placed on the federal courts by
wasteful remands. And they should weigh these considerations
against concerns of administrative competency and the extent to
which disability determinations might benefit from allowing the
agency to "bring its expertise to bear upon the matter." 199 In short,
they should not unquestioningly apply the principles of Chenely to the
Social Security disability review process.

198

See ScHwARTz, supra note 100, § 8.2, at 438.

199

See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam).
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42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006)
§ 405. Evidence, procedure, and certification for payments
(g) Judicial review
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to
him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow. Such action shall be brought in
the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which
the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he
does not reside or have his principal place of business within any such
judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. As part of the Commissioner's answer the Commissioner of
Social Security shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been
denied by the Commissioner of Social Security or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the hearing before the Commissioner of
Social Security, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to
submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question of
conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations.
The court may, on motion of the Commissioner of Social Security
made for good cause shown before the Commissioner files the Commissioner's answer, remand the case to the Commissioner of Social
Security for further action by the Commissioner of Social Security,
and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before
the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that
there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause
for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior
proceeding; and the Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the
case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so
ordered, modify or affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact or the
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Commissioner's decision, or both, and shall file with the court any
such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and, in
any case in which the Commissioner has not made a decision fully
favorable to the individual, a transcript of the additional record and
testimony upon which the Commissioner's action in modifying or
affirming was based. Such additional or modified findings of fact and
decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of
the original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court
shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as ajudgment in other civil actions. Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in
the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or
any vacancy in such office.

